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Inspections reveal 
lack of support 
and investment
Professor Pete Murphy, 
Nottingham Business School, 
says that a pragmatic and 
cautious approach to the 
first inspections reveals 
services in dire need of 
support and investment 
I 
have long been an advocate for the reintroduction 
of external independent inspections for the Fire 
and Rescue Service1, but also a fierce critic of both 
the scope and strategic positioning of the new 
Inspectorate – Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 
and Fire and Rescue Services – and the parameters 
imposed by the government on the first tranche of service 
inspections2.
I therefore read the individual reports and the 
Inspectorate’s summary of its findings from the first 
tranche with a certain amount of trepidation. What would 
they find? How consistent and evidence based would their 
judgements be and how robust will be their reporting? 
Will they help services to improve, will they encourage 
mutual trust and respect between the inspectors and the 
inspected and will they justify the additional burdens on 
the fire and rescue services?
In assessing the outcome, it is essential to remember 
that this is a new Inspectorate, a new inspection regime 
and relatively inexperienced inspectors with precious little 
in terms of financial or performance information upon 
which to build judgements or triangulate evidence. They 
will get better at collecting evidence, organising the process 
and simply knowing what is involved. 
In the absence of comprehensive and objective 
performance indicators or standards, we knew they 
would inevitably have to be over reliant on both 
subjective judgements and relative rather than absolute 
performance criteria. 
In terms of reporting, the reports and their presentation 
needed to balance the difference in the expectations 
of their varied audiences; the government, the public, 
key stakeholders and partners as well as the services 
themselves, their frontline staff and the media. 
These stakeholders are all looking for slightly different 
things from the process, although they are united in their 
collective and individual need for both confidence and 
reassurance. Could they be confident and have faith in 
the process, in the judgements and in their collective 
expectation that improvements to the services and to the 
safety of the public will follow from their efforts?
The Inspectorate itself needed to justify the government’s 
investment. It needed to balance its confidence in its 
judgements, with the realistic expectations for clear 
independent assessments and robust messages called for 
by all stakeholders. Could it provide recommendations 
and conclusions that will assist fire and rescue authorities 
to improve and deliver their individual services while 
constructively informing both national and local policy 
development and external regulation and assurance?
What are the Headline Findings?
To an extent, the big issues exposed by the reports are 
relatively well known and/or strongly suspected within the 
Fire and Rescue Service community. They are not that new. 
However, before these reports were published they lacked 
consistent, comprehensive, independent and (to a degree) 
quality-assured evidence. 
The first tranche may be the results from a limited 
service inspection of only 14 services and 14 relatively 
small services, (as London and the metropolitans are in 
later tranches), but they still represent the most significant 
release of data, information and intelligence on the 
operational efficiency of our local fire and rescue services 
in over 12 years. 
Just as Grenfell and Hackitt3 revealed the serious and 
unacceptable inadequacies of the national fire regulations 
and their enforcement, so these reports confirm what 
a lot of ad hoc, partial and informal evidence has been 
suggesting over the last nine years. It provides the detail 
to substantiate the highly critical NAO4 and the Public 
Accounts Committee5 reports of 2015 and 2016. It shows 
the implications on the ground of the DCLG and the Home 
Office’s inadequate stewardship of the Service.
Service Driven by Short Term Priorities
The picture that is emerging is of a Service that has drifted 
into a situation where decisions are driven by financial 
imperatives and short term priorities; where external 
considerations rather the improvement and development 
of a citizen centred service have become predominant; and 
where the infrastructure and information available to assist 
services in meeting their ever-changing challenges has 
been allowed to crumble, disappear and at times has been 
actively dismantled.
The Service has not drifted into this situation of its own 
volition; it has drifted into this situation through a lack of 
national leadership from government as clearly signposted 
by the NAO and the PAC reports. MHCLG’s culpability 
is beyond dispute, but there is no substantial evidence 
in these reports to suggest the direction of travel for the 
Service has significantly changed after two years under the 
Home Office.
The reports confirm that the data, intelligence and 
information available to make decisions at local service 
delivery levels is just as inadequate as it was at the national 
level in 2015, when the NAO reported and as it remains to 
this day. ‘Data needs to improve’ is the summary report’s 
big sign-off message. 
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Inadequate data combined with the absence of national 
standards ‘has resulted in local variations in almost every 
aspect of what each fire and rescue service does’. Too often 
staff are using ‘antiquated and unreliable’ systems with 
outdated technology and there has been ‘poor investment 
in technology’. 
Any comparative study of 14 services or organisations 
let alone the whole sector is going to show variations in 
priorities, investments, standards and performance. 
Some variation is inevitable and reflects differences in 
demography, geography and risks, a reality acknowledged 
in the Inspectorate’s summary report. This is what is 
referred to as warranted or justifiable variation. However, 
the inspections reveal far too much unwarranted variation 
in the local delivery of fire and rescue services, and that 
this unwarranted variation is almost ubiquitous across 
response, protection and preventative services. 
Disconcertingly they grade only three out of 14 
service as ‘good’ at looking after the people who work 
for them, when ‘good’ is defined as ‘meeting pre-defined 
grading criteria, which are informed by any relevant 
national guidance or standards’ ie standards that we 
would normally expect them to meet. The 
inadequacy in the way that local services 
manage their resources and most importantly 
their people is one of the most startling overall 
findings and many commentators, not least 
the representative bodies, will quite rightly 
want to highlight the urgent need for action in 
this area.
Impact of Under Resourcing
The other huge but not unexpected finding 
is that protection and prevention services 
have been systematically under resourced. 
The causes are national as well as local 
and are common to many public services. 
Nevertheless financial reductions have 
disproportionately affected protection and 
prevention services, and the ‘consequences 
of long-term under-investment in this crucial area are 
too often evident’. Many services are not even attempting 
to evaluate the benefits of their prevention activities and 
services are struggling to recruit, train and retain staff 
with the specialist skills they need for more complex and 
technical protection work. Of the 14 services inspected 
the inspectors graded only five as good at protecting the 
public through fire safety regulation.     
Stepping back and looking at some wider 
considerations, the Inspectorate have taken a very 
pragmatic approach to their first inspections, and to their 
initial reporting. 
They have learnt some lessons from the piloting 
programme6 and from previous inspection programmes. 
In a very sensitive Service at a particularly sensitive 
time, they have prudently phased-in their first national 
inspection programme. They have acknowledged their own 
and the sector’s resource limitations, while adopting the 
modern approach of ‘inspection for improvement rather 
than for compliance’. 
They have consciously focussed on a group of smaller 
services, some of which have had performance challenges 
in the past but with some larger services included. In their 
first tranche they have avoided having to make judgements 
on potentially more high profile or contentious services 
such as London or the metropolitan services. 
They have also been commendably cautious in 
the presentation of their findings and of the lessons 
to be learned from the first programme. They have 
communicated professionally and acknowledged and 
carefully calibrated their messages to the sensitivities, 
needs and expectations of their key stakeholders. No less 
than 11 of the first 14 services inspected receive positive 
name checks for commendable aspects of their service in 
the summary report. 
Nevertheless, the reports have managed to convey some 
clear and invaluable findings as well as some challenging 
messages for all of their key stakeholders.
Their strong focus on understanding risk and the clear 
acknowledgement that fire and rescue services must 
deliver a risk based, rather than demand led, service, is a 
welcome relief after numerous government publications 
have started to make decisions and justify policy based on 
the latter. 
In terms of collaboration between the emergency 
services, it is interesting to notice that, with the exception 
of collaborative work with the police on arson and fire 
setting in community safety partnerships, the vast majority 
of examples of good or innovative collaborative working 
come from initiatives with health, housing or local 
government, as well as work across borders and with other 
fire and rescue services.  
The summary report commends ongoing work 
with key stakeholders such as the NFCC, CIPFA, and 
even academics on both standards and data and 
intelligence. It acknowledges that its findings confirm and 
reflect the concerns on fire safety regulations over both 
compliance and enforcement that are at the heart of the 
Hackitt review6.
Finally, although neither acknowledging the process 
nor the reports of the fire peer challenge and sector 
led improvement regime (there is no list of reports and 
publications referred to in the individual service reports), 
the findings clearly confirm the inadequacy of the previous 
process for ensuring continual improvement or for 
providing public assurance on the achievement of value 
for money.
Whatever else I may disagree with, I agree with the 
report’s final comment – this situation needs to improve. 
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